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ABSTRACT
Conventional biometric systems use the original biometrics 
for authentication, which exposes the users’ identities to a 
risk of being compromised. The Randomized Radon 
Signature (RRS) is a cancellable biometric technique that 
protects face biometrics during authentication by using 
Radon transform and random projection. The extracted 
Radon signatures are generated from the parametric domain 
of the face and then projected into a random multi-space of a 
uniform distribution. The generated RRS templates are non-
reversible, suitable for image-based statistical face 
classifiers and reissueable. In this paper the fisherface 
algorithm is used to conduct a comparison between the 
original face images and the RRS templates. Results have 
shown a dramatic 53.37% enhancement in the genuine and 
impostor distributions separation that leads to a 31.34% 
reduction in the equal error rate. 
Index Terms — cancellable biometric, face recognition, 
Radon transform, random projection. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Biometrics is one of the most precious data an individual 
could carry. It uniquely represents our identity and is being 
utilized to replace traditional authentication methods. 
However, unlike passwords or tokens, if the biometric data 
is lost or stolen, it cannot be replaced or cancelled. The 
number of unique biometrics of each individual is limited, 
for example once face, two irises, ten fingers etc. In 
addition, in order to sustain a reliable biometric system, 
biometrics has to be permanent over the lifetime of its 
owners. This however extends the risk of an unlawful usage 
of a compromised biometric over that period. In order to 
overcome this security obstacle a comprehensive protection 
technique has to be adopted, which will not only protect 
biometrics during storage but also during authentication. 
This is achieved by conducting the authentication in the 
protected domain without the need to reverse the protected 
data. Furthermore the protection technique has to enable 
reissuance of new protected biometric templates from the 
same original data. 
The first attempt to protect biometrics by cryptographic 
verification was for an iris based authentication scheme [1]. 
Error correction code was utilized to overcome the 
dynamical changes of biometrics. A voice biometric 
hardening key algorithm has been developed by extracting a 
distinguishable set of features from voice segments to 
generate a sharing table [2]. The fuzzy vault scheme [3] has 
also been proposed to protect biometrics cryptographically 
by a committed value that is infeasible for an attacker to 
learn. Later, the scheme was implemented on fingerprint 
biometrics [4]. The technique was evaluated at 20-30% false 
rejection rate without the alignment of fingerprint features in 
the fuzzy vault domain. A facial cryptographic user-
dependant key generator was also introduced by binarizing 
the optimum distinguishable facial features extracted by 
linear dimensionality reduction techniques [5]. 
The first cancellable biometric technique was 
introduced using an intentional repeatable distortion of a 
biometrics signal based on chosen transforms [6]. Another 
technique extracts the facial features by a linear space 
projection and then maps them onto a multiple random 
subspaces to obtain a quantized binary code (RMQ) [7]. 
Savvides et al [8] generate a cancellable biometric by 
encrypting a training set of images to construct a minimum 
average correlation energy filter for face authentication. 
Zeng et al [9] presented a secure biometric key using lattice 
mapping. The biometric feature vector is mapped in the 
lattice space using a certain codeword. Recently another 
cancellable biometric technique [10] has been developed  to 
protect face biometric though the usage of co-occurrence 
matrices and a high-order polynomial mapping. 
In this paper we present a new secure biometric system 
for image-based authentication that generates an endless 
number of non-reversible cancellable templates from the 
same face image by using the Radon transform and multi-
space random projection. The overall method is presented in 
Section 2 including the security analysis. Section 3 outlines 
the fisherface algorithm while Section 4 focuses on the 
results. The conclusion is provided in Section 5. 
2. THE GENERATION OF THE RRS TEMPLATES
The RRS is a user-dependant transformation which is
defined by the random multi-space used for each user. Each 
face image is used to generate the RRS template which then 
replaces the image in the database and the authentication 
system as shown in figure 1. Each user has a random multi-
space that is associated with the current issue of the RRS 
templates and stored for authenticating that particular issue. 
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In case that issue has been compromised or lost, a new one 
can be generated by using different random multi-space and 
the previous one can be discarded. These multi-spaces need 
not be secret since the transformation is non-reversible 
given that the original face is unavailable. 
Using the same original face image an unlimited 
number of RRS templates can be issued by changing the 
random multi-spaces, which overcomes the limitation on the 
number of unique biometric characteristics of each 
individual. The generation of the RRS templates is 
established over two stages, the Radon signature and the 
random projection of the face. 
2.1. The Radon Signature 
First the face image is transformed into the Radon space 
(parametric domain) using the two-dimensional equation 
(1), where ρ and θ are the polar coordinates of the domain 
and f is the image. The Radon transform, [11], is a line-
integral transformation that operates on planes and can only 
be used in the form of two dimensions or higher. 
∫
∞
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The Radon signatures of the transformed image are then 
formulated in the parametric domain by the integration of all 
possible orientations within the space at a fixed distance ρ
from the origin. This is given in equation (2), where x and y
are the spatial image coordinates. For each face image there 
are a set of signatures that uniquely represent the face. 
)(θiw  is a weighting function. 
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Considering that )(θiw  is selected from a uniformly 
distributed random space, S(ρ) can be presented as a vector 
sl, of all orientations at index l that corresponds to ρ. 
Rcs Tll 1κ=    (4) 
R is the random space in which { }Miwi ,...2,1|)( =θ  are 
contained, cl is a vector of all orientations in the parametric 
domain, and 1κ  is an offset constant. 
2.2. Random Projection of the Face 
Simultaneously fl is constructed from the spatial domain of 
the face image bl, where l is the index of the image column 
vector, Q is a uniformly distributed random space that is 
independent of R, and 2κ  is a constant offset. 
Qbf Tll 2κ=    (5) 
The random projection in equations (4) and (5) is a
linear transformation that is based on the Johnson-
Lindenstrauss lemma [12]. 
( ) ( ) 222 1)()(1 yxyxyx −+≤−<−− εε ff  (6) 
It states that any n points in the p-dimensional 
Euclidean space E can be mapped to an O((ln n)/ε2)-
dimensional space, E’ and f: E→E’, such that the distance 
between any two points, x and y, is preserved within an 
arbitrary factor of ε. This is due to the assumption that 
random subspaces are approximately orthogonal. 
lll fst += QbRc
T
l
T
l 21 κκ +=   (7) 
The final stage of the RRS template { }Nll ,...,2,1| =t
formulation is the mixing operation of the M-dimensional 
vectors sl and fl. Since R is independent and different from 
Q, and neither bl nor cl are known, the RRS template { }Nll ,...,2,1| =t  cannot be demixed nor reversed. 
Obviously the template does not resemble the facial shape 
nor contains any visual information. 
In theory, these RRS templates can replace the original 
face images in any image-based authentication system that 
uses statistical linear feature extraction. For the purpose of 
this paper, the RRS templates are evaluated using the 
fisherface algorithm [13]. 
2.3. Security Analysis of the RRS 
As explained above the system equation (7) is not reversible 
due to the absence of original face images. Therefore, two 
different types of attacks will be considered in this section. 
The first is an exhaustive search attack (ESA) with the 
assumption that no information is available on the RRS 
templates except of the random subspaces, the transform 
function and the templates themselves. 
Let n be the number of binary bits contained in each 
template.  The probability of ESA to succeed is defined by 
the length n, which is of the order of 4101× . Therefore the 
ESA probability of the RRS template given by nESAP
−
=
12  
is negligible, which indicates the immunity of the templates 
against such attacks. 
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Figure 1: The conceptual diagram of the RRS framework.
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An elegant attack can be conducted if some statistical 
information on the RRS templates is available. To analysis 
this type of risk the guessing entropy and its Shannon 
entropy lower-bound are used [14]. Let Tc be a set of RRS 
templates of the same class c=1,2,..K. The number of 
registered templates per class in the database m is 
determined by the system and fixed for all classes. However, 
because the ideal condition ∞→WB εε  when 0→Wε and 
εB>εW does not exist for any function classifier, the lower-
bound of the guessing entropy G(T) tends to Ge(T) (9), 
where εB and εW are the average distances between classes 
and within classes respectively. H(T) is the Shannon 
entropy. 
12)( )(4
1 +≥ TT HG   (8) 
1)( 4 +≥ KG
m
e T    (9) 
This leaves us with a lower-bound that is proportional 
to the number of registered classes and templates per class 
in the RRS database. 
3. SUMMARY OF THE FISHERFACE ALGORITHM
The fisherface algorithm [13] is a linear transformation that 
is used for image-based authentication of face biometric. It 
projects the data from the original space of N dimensions 
into a space of up to c-1 dimensions, where c is the number 
of classes and c<<N. Let Γ1,Γ2,…ΓL be the face images and 
L is the number of training images of each class c. The 
optimum projection is achieved by finding the generalized 
eigenvectors uopt of BW SS
1−  that maximizes the scattering 
ratio. ( )uSuuSuu
u
W
T
B
T
opt maxarg=   (10) 
The scatter matrices of the between-class SB and the 
within-class SW are precomputed separately. 
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When a new face image is acquired for authentication, 
Γnew, it will be projected using a set of the best describing 
eigenvectors uk, k=1,2,…,d’ as shown in (14). The weights 
Ω
T=[ω1,ω2,ω3,…,ωd’] are then extracted from the reduced 
space and are then used to find the minimum Euclidean 
distance, εi, with the corresponding face class i=1,2,…,c. 
( )ΨΓu −= newTkkω   (14) 
22
ii ΩΩ −=ε    (15) 
The ideal projection should cluster entries from the 
same class together while separating them from other 
classes.  
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The CMU Advance Multimedia Processing Lab (AMP) face 
database [15] has 975 facial images for 13 individuals 
captured by CCD camera and stored in 8-bits grey levels 
112× 92 pixels. Each individual has 75 images in the same 
lighting conditions but with different facial expressions such 
as neutral, happy, angry sad and surprised. 
For comparison two separate fisherface projections are 
conducted with five enrolled training images or templates 
per class. Therefore the lower-bound of the guessing entropy 
(9) of the RRS templates is Ge(T) ≥ 17.24 since m=5 and 
K=13. As  n=8× 112× 92 bits, the ESA success probability 
is almost zero PESA≈0. The accuracy performance is 
evaluated using the false acceptance (FAR), false rejection 
(FRR) and equal error (ERR) rates as indicators for a 
verification based procedure. 
Figure 2. The genuine and impostor distributions. The left hand-side plot shows the overlap between both distributions of the original 
face images that has been reduced for the RRS templates as shown in the right hand-side plot. 
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Investigating the genuine and impostor distributions of 
the original images and the RRS templates has shown in 
figure 2 a clear separation with a reduced overlap that leads 
to a reduction of 31.34% in the EER. 
Alternative way of evaluating the distribution 
separation is the measure D [16], the higher the value of D
the better the performance. Using the mean μg and the 
standard deviation σg of the genuine distribution and their 
equivalents μi and σi of the impostor distribution, the 
measure shows an improvement of 53.37% for the RRS 
templates as shown in Table 1. 
( )2221 igigD σσμμ +−=   (16) 
The overall accuracy performance of the system with
respect to the number of used eigenvectors is shown in 
figure 3. The best EER of the original images is 0.61% 
when 4 eigenvectors are used while the best EER of the 
RRS templates is 0.42% for 6 eigenvectors. 
5. CONCLUSION
In this work a new cancellable biometric technique for 
image-based face authentication was introduced. The RRS 
templates were generated by using the Radon transform and 
the multi-space random projection. These non-reversible 
templates can be reissued for the same original face image 
by changing the random multi-spaces. Using the fisherface 
algorithm the evaluation has shown an improved separation 
of genuine and impostor distributions by 53.37%. This in 
turn has reduced the EER to 0.42% leading to a 31.34% 
accuracy enhancement for the RRS templates over the
original face images. 
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Figure 3: The accuracy performance versus the number of used 
eigenvectors d’.
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Original AMP
Transformed AMP
D μg μi d’ EER[%]
Original 3.26 1.00 8.76 4 0.6108 
RRS 5.00 0.75 4.20 6 0.4194 
Table 1: The best operation point of the original images and 
the RRS templates. d’ is number of eigenvector used. 
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